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THE EVOLUTION OF COMMERCIAL LAW
NORMS: LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Amelia H. Boss*
INTRODUCTION

C

ommercial law in the United States is the product of centuries of
development. For many years, apart from the common law influences of our mother country,1 the development of commercial norms and
commercial laws in the United States occurred with relatively little regard for international norms and international commercial law developments.2 Indeed, for many scholars in the United States looking at the development of commercial law norms, the study of commercial law had
been primarily inwardly focused, for example, on the role of entities such
as the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Law Institute in the process,3 or the appropriate allocation of responsibility between the states and the federal government.4
The landscape has changed somewhat over the past two decades, however, as we have observed the emergence of an “International Uniform
* Trustee Professor of Law, Drexel University, Earle Macke School of Law.
1. One might also note the origins of the Uniform Commercial Code in the British
codification movement of the nineteenth century. See generally GERALD POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (Tony Honoré & Joseph Raz eds., 1986). See
also CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF
ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM 76–77 (1981); Charles Noble Gregory, Bentham and the
Codifiers, 13 HARV. L. REV. 344, 356 (1900). Indeed, Bentham once wrote to President
Madison volunteering to create a code for the New World. Jeremy Bentham, Legislator
of the World: Writings on Codification, Law and Education, in THE COLLECTED WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 20–21 (Philip Schofield & Jonathan Harris eds., 1998).
2. This is ironic, given the historical roots of commercial law in the law merchant or
law of the itinerant merchant, which was law that had no geographic limitations.
3. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces & David Frisch, On the UCC Revision Process: A Reply
to Dean Scott, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1217 (1996); Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (1996);
Steven L. Schwarcz, A Fundamental Inquiry into the Statutory Rulemaking Process of
Private Legislatures, 29 GA. L. REV. 909, 921 (1995); Alan Schwartz, The Still Questionable Role of Private Legislatures, 62 LA. L. REV. 1147 (2002); Alan Schwartz & Robert
E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595 (1995).
But see Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 (1999).
4. See, e.g., A. Brooke Overby, Modeling UCC Drafting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645
(1996); A. Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297
(2003); Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws
Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83 (1993).
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Commercial Code.” The 1980 Convention on the International Sale of
Goods,5 which came into force a little over twenty years ago, is, of
course, one of the core components of this emerging code; joining it are
newer conventions such as the Cape Town Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment,6 promulgated by the Institute for the Unification of Private International Law (“UNIDROIT”),7 and the Hague
Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of Securities Held with an Intermediary, promulgated by the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 2002.8 Supplementing these “hard
laws” are, of course, soft law products9 such as the UNIDROIT Prin5. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3.
6. UNIDROIT Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16,
2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-10, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conven
tions/mobile-equipment/mobile-equipment.pdf.
7. UNIDROIT is an independent intergovernmental organization founded in 1926
and presently composed of sixty-three Member States. The Institute’s seat is located in
Rome. UNIDROIT: An Overview, http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=84219
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
8. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in Respect of
Securities Held with an Intermediary, July 5, 2006, available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/
index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=72. See also generally James Steven Rogers,
Conflict of Laws for Transactions in Securities Held Through Intermediaries, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 285 (2006). There are other completed international commercial law instruments as well as others on the drafting tables of organizations such as UNCITRAL,
UNIDROIT, and the Hague Conference; these are just illustrations of the phenomenon.
9. The following is a cogent description of the dichotomy between “hard law” and
“soft law”:
Soft law means rules that do not emerge from an autonomous source of law and
are not law in that sense. In the international commercial and financial sphere,
soft law often means proposals or sets of principles from UNIDROIT,
UNCITRAL or other such organizations, or from think-tanks that aspire to reflect the living law particularly at the transnational level. Academic opinion
may also be part of soft law. If soft law reaches the level of treaty law, it will
operate in that category and becomes, then, law. Soft law may also attain the
level of law as custom or general principle. . . . To repeat, short of soft law
emerging as custom or general principle, it is not law, and therefore not a norm
that must be applied, although it may provide guidance (usually supplementary
to hard law or as some manifestation thereof). The UNIDROIT and European
Contract Principles are of this nature, as are many unratified UNIDROIT and
UNCITRAL projects, and their model laws.
J.H. Dalhuisen, Custom and Its Revival in Transnational Private Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 339, 355–57 (2008). For a discussion of the various types of international
lawmaking, including “soft law” and “hard law,” see ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN,
THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 211–29 (2007).
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ciples of International Commercial Contracts, which, like the Restatement of Contracts in the United States, can be used to fill the gaps left by
the “harder” treaty-based law.10 Model laws, drafted for States to use as
guidance if they so desire, are another form of “soft law”11 used in the
international commercial arena.12
As these international conventions and products have evolved, however, interesting questions have been presented: how international norms
take root; how they can be cultivated and the unique challenges they
raise for policymakers; the interrelationship among the various methods
of lawmaking (whether their final results are categorized as hard law or
soft law); the relationship between international and national lawmaking
bodies, and the relationship (in the United States) between federal and
state lawmakers.
The more recent area of electronic commerce offers a unique opportunity to examine these issues. The opportunity is unique for several reasons. Unlike many (or most) areas of commercial law, the evolution of
commercial law norms governing electronic communications and transactions is a relatively recent phenomenon. The speed with which electronic commerce has developed and spread throughout the world has
placed a premium on the need to develop governing norms definitively
and just as swiftly. As a result, what took generations to occur in areas
such as sales or secured transactions has occurred in a matter of decades
with electronic commerce.
The case study of electronic commerce reveals several important lessons. Some of these lessons mirror the experiences from other areas of
commercial law. First, it is imperative that any legal structure be built
upon and reflect commercial practices in order for there to be an accept10. For a helpful book on the UNIDROIT Principles, see MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL,
AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (1994).
11. A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter, The Contours and Significance
of Private Authority in International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 333, 367–68 (A. Claire Cutler et al., 1999) (“Soft law includes statements of
principles, guidelines, understandings, model laws[,] and codes, and declarations that . . .
are ‘neither strictly binding norms of law, nor completely irrelevant political maxims, and
operate in a grey zone between law and politics.’”).
12. Examples of model laws in the field include the U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE
LAW, MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985, U.N. Sales No.
E.08.V.4 (2008), and the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Credit Transfers, in Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of Its Twenty-Fifth Session, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex 1, U.N. DOC. A/47/17 (May 22, 1992), reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 587 (1993).
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able and viable system for trade. Second, while commercial practices are
developing or in flux, it is crucial that any legal norms be sufficiently
minimal and flexible to accommodate growth and change. This flexibility and adaptability, deemed important to many actors in the development
of legal norms, can easily be lost, however; and harmonization can be
defeated when these norms are adapted as part of “hard law” through the
process of implementation. And thus a third, related lesson: where too
high a premium is placed on speed in developing rules, the end product
runs the risk of stultifying or jeopardizing future developments.
There are other lessons, however, that can be learned from electronic
commerce, lessons that are not as apparent in other areas. Elsewhere in
this Symposium Issue, Professor McDonald has critically examined three
metaphors often used to describe international law reform activities,
“harmonization,” “transplantation,” and “viral propagation.”13 Electronic
commerce law reform activity is a good illustration of a different form of
international lawmaking, the process of symbiosis. It is symbiotic in several respects: there is symbiosis between the domestic and the international development of norms; between and among countries; and between the legal world and the business world. A second and related key
point: while elsewhere there may be discussions of the appropriate roles
of “soft” and “hard” lawmaking, and the relative merits of these types of
lawmaking, study in the area of electronic commerce demonstrates that
what is important is not necessarily the form that the lawmaking product
takes (treaty, statute, model law, model agreement), but the process that
leads to its formulation. In other words, the process is in many ways as
important if not more so than the product itself. Most important are the
development and exchange of ideas, and the education that occurs during
the drafting process.14 A corollary is that one cannot really judge the success of either a soft law or a hard law project solely by its (intended) implementation or adoption by a state or nation state; rather, the impact
must be assessed by the effect that the product and the process have on
the development of the law more generally.
There are a few other final and more sobering lessons. One is that
when there is the occasional “misstep” in the development of legal
norms, where a product of questionable long-term value is developed, the
13. Roderick A. Macdonald, Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in International
Context, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 603, 603 (2009).
14. The author would have to admit to a certain bias in favor of education, given her
career in the field. It should be noted that there is a project within the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”), the TrainForTrade programme,
which focuses on training and capacity building in the field of electronic commerce. See
generally TrainForTrade, http://learn.unctad.org/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
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same factors that contributed to the symbiotic development of law in the
first place may similarly contribute to the propagation of this “misstep”
in other jurisdictions. The end result may not be harmonization, but
fragmentation. Correcting or containing that misstep becomes problematic. A related observation: as legal norms advance in their maturation, the
process of symbiosis slows down as other differences emerge. It is too
early to tell whether this lull in the symbiotic process signals its end.
Now on to the story.
I. THE BIRTH OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LEGAL NORMS
In the area of electronic commerce, in a short period of twelve years,
we have seen (at a minimum) three instruments emerge from one international body, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”),15 in a process that has been called “vertical integration.”16 Other electronic commerce products have emerged from other
U.N. bodies such as the United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and
Electronic Business (“UN/CEFACT”),17 from regional harmonization
programs in electronic commerce (such as that within the Association of
15. These three instruments are the UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, U.N. Doc. A/Res/51/162/Annex, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1999); the
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT 2001,
U.N. Sales No. E.02.V.8 (2002); and the 2005 United Nations Convention on the Use of
Electronic Communications in International Contracts, G.A. Res. 60/21, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/21 (Dec. 9, 2005). The Convention was published with an accompanying explanatory note. U.N. CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, at 13–100, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.2 (2007) [hereinafter
SECRETARIAT’S EXPLANATORY NOTE].
16. Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmaking,
32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 854, 868–72 (2007) (speaking of the progression from the two
model laws to the United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications
in International Contracts as “vertical incrementalism,” where “international organizations dig more deeply in a particular area over progressive rounds”).
17. Formerly known as the United Nations Working Party on the Facilitation of International Trade Procedures (Working Party or W.P.4), it operates in Geneva under the
auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and is the international
body responsible for developing international standards for electronic data interchange.
See United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business, About Us,
http://www.unece.org/cefact/about.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). Another U.N. entity
that has taken a role in the evolution of electronic commerce norms is the UNCTAD,
which among other efforts publishes an Information Economy Report that “focus[es] on
trends in information and communications technologies . . . , such as e-commerce and ebusiness, and on national and international policy and strategy options for improving the
development impact of these technologies in developing countries.” UNCTAD, Main
Publications, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1717&lang=1 (last
visited Apr. 1, 2009).
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Southeast Asian Nations),18 from industry groups,19 and from efforts to
accommodate electronic commerce within other substantive projects (in
the area of secured transactions or maritime law, for example) by borrowing principles and rules from electronic commerce instruments.20 Ultimately, within the area of electronic commerce, we have examples of a
variety of soft law and hard law approaches to electronic commerce. Yet
the three products produced by UNCITRAL, two model laws (which
might be characterized as soft law) and a convention (hard law), provide
a unique opportunity to examine the evolution of commercial law norms,
an evolution in which UNCITRAL has played a key role. Two of these
UNCITRAL products (one model law, one convention) contain strikingly similar if not identical provisions. A study of the evolution of these
instruments and their success in achieving adherence or implementation
gives us an opportunity to compare and examine the interrelationship
between soft law and hard law products. Though the sample is small, this
study enables us to examine questions such as whether the existence of
soft law is a help or a hindrance to the development of hard law; whether
soft law or hard law is more effective in achieving adoption; whether soft
18. For a description of the products of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in
the area of electronic commerce, see Chris Connolly, Using the Electronic Communications Convention to Harmonize National and International Electronic Commerce Laws:
An ASEAN Case Study, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS: AN IN-DEPTH GUIDE AND
SOURCEBOOK 315, 317 (Amelia H. Boss & W. Kilian eds., 2008) [hereinafter U.N. GUIDE
TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS].
19. The International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), for example, has produced its
Electronic Uniform Customs and Practices (“eUCP”), a supplement to its Uniform Customs and Practices 500 (“UCP 500”) that covers situations where electronic presentation
of documents occurs, and General Usage for International Digitally Ensured Commerce
(“GUIDEC”) and GUIDEC II, which provide a legal framework for the use of digital
signatures and certification authorities. See LORNA BRAZELL, ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
LAW AND REGULATION 84 (2004) (describing the goals and content of GUIDEC); Coastline Solutions, eUCP: Online Training in eUCP, http://www.coastlinesolutions.com/
eUCP.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) (describing the UCP 500 versus the eUCP). In addition, it has published eTerms 2004 for parties trading electronically, and an accompanying ICC Guide to Electronic Contracting explaining the use of those terms. See ICC’s
Commission on Commercial Law and Practice, http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/law/id279/
index.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009). See also Christopher Kuner, ICC Perspectives on the
United Nations Electronic Communications Convention, in U.N. GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 18, at 415, 415–21.
20. Two scholars examining the working agendas of all the UNCITRAL working
groups during the year 2007 observed that five of the six working groups “are revisiting
or revising existing international instruments to account for practical experience and
technical developments since adoption.” Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 16, at 873
n.53.
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law or hard law is more effective in achieving harmonization (for, as
Professor Macdonald observed, nations can adopt the same or similar
products, but without tempering, the results would not necessarily be
harmonious);21 whether hard law is feasible without the earlier development of soft law; and the impact of drafting hard law without the prior
existence of soft law.
II. SETTING THE STAGE: THE EVOLUTION OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCIAL
PRACTICES
The story of the evolution of electronic commerce norms begins well
before UNCITRAL produced its first model law in 1996. Twenty-five
years ago, the Internet as we know it today was a thing of science fiction,
and the phrase “electronic commerce” was unheard of, yet the glimmers
of electronic commerce were beginning to emerge. Banks and other
businesses and institutions started to use computer technology to communicate and explored ways to harness the technology for a competitive
advantage, though the use of these technologies was limited. Nonetheless, the thought that some type of legal framework might be needed began to take hold.22 As early as 1984, the issue of the need for a legal
structure to govern electronic commerce was articulated on an international level by UNCITRAL, although at that time the phrase used to describe the phenomenon was “automatic data processing.”23 Despite
UNCITRAL subsequently calling upon all nations to review their legal
rules affecting the use of electronic technologies in commerce,24 there
21. Macdonald, supra note 13, at 623–24.
22. The banking industry, at the forefront of developing legal norms for electronic
commerce, led the way with the formulation of products both domestically (e.g., UCC
Article 4A) and internationally. See UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit
Transfers, supra note 12.
23. See UNCITRAL, Report of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law on the Work of Its Seventeenth Session, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17, ¶¶ 135–
36, U.N. Doc. A/39/17 (1984). This followed receipt of a report by the Secretary-General
on the legal aspects of automatic data processing. See Secretary-General, Legal Aspects
of Automatic Data Processing: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/254
(1984). That report identified several legal issues involving electronic communications
technology: the legal value of computer records as evidence, the requirement of a writing
and its application in an electronic environment, authentication of the source and veracity
of electronic transmissions, general conditions applied in electronic transactions, liability
for erroneous or unauthorized transmissions, and electronic transmissions of bills of lading, which have traditionally been represented by a piece of paper. Id.
24. See UNCITRAL, Report of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law on the Work of Its Seventeenth Session, supra note 23, ¶ 136. This recommendation was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. See G.A. Res. 40/71,
¶ 5, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (Dec. 11, 1985).
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was virtually no response from governments around the world, on any
level. In hindsight, that was probably a fortunate result, as over the next
decade electronic commercial practices continued to grow and evolve.
Indeed, electronic commerce practices began to develop at a time when
no states, and no nation states, had laws tailored for electronic commerce.
During the late 1980s, the use of electronic technologies in commerce
increased and continued to develop, morphing from “automatic data
processing” (“ADP”) into “electronic data interchange” (“EDI”),25 and
the legal challenges it presented began to attract greater attention. One of
the first responders was the Nordic Legal Community, which suggested
interchange agreements between private trading partners to govern their
use of electronic technologies in the communication and contracting
process. This initial idea resulted in the ICC adopting the Uniform Rules
of Conduct for Interchange of Trade Data by Teletransmission (“UNCID
Rules”) in 1987.26 The UNCID Rules were a small set of nonmandatory
rules, which EDI users and suppliers of network services could incorporate into any agreement between parties using electronic communications
technologies. Following the publication of the UNCID Rules, numerous
model interchange agreements were developed—by user groups
representing specific industries (such as Odette, representing the automotive industry, and the International Maritime Committee, representing the
maritime industry), by industry groups (such as the U.K. EDI Association and the EDI Council of Canada), by attorney groups (such as the
American Bar Association),27 and by multinational organizations (such
as the European Commission through its Trade Electronic Data Inter-

25. “Electronic data interchange” has been defined as “the computer-to-computer
interchange of strictly formatted messages that represent documents other than monetary
instruments.” NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FED. INFO. PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBL’N 161-2, ANNOUNCING THE STANDARD FOR ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE (EDI)
(Apr. 29, 1996), available at http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip161-2.htm. The shift
from ADP to EDI is significant. ADP, which refers to computer assisted storing, manipulating or processing information with minimal or no human interaction, is most often
used to describe internal uses of information technology within a business. Conversely,
EDI encompasses using information technology to communicate with external parties
such as suppliers and customers.
26. Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Special Joint Comm. UNIFORM RULES OF
CONDUCT FOR INTERCHANGE OF TRADE DATA BY TELETRANSMISSION (UNCID), ICC
Publ’n No. 452 (1988).
27. See, e.g., Elec. Messaging Servs. Task Force, The Commercial Use of Electronic
Data Interchange—A Report and Model Trading Partner Agreement, 45 BUS. LAW.
1645, 1647–48 (1990).
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change Systems Programme).28 These model interchange agreements
were suggested for use by private parties who agreed to communicate
electronically in their conduct of commercial transactions (generally purchase and sale transactions).
Cumulatively, these private law products, themselves a form of “soft
law,” were to have a profound impact. First, most of these model agreements were the results of collaboration between attorneys and industry
participants; indeed, the agreements themselves dealt with both legal and
business issues. Thus, they represent efforts to adapt the law to the practice, and the practice to the law. Second, groups in many geographic sectors, industries, and countries worked diligently in developing their own
agreements, but not without studying agreements that had been produced
in other sectors, industries, and countries. Thus, symbiosis was already at
work, and norms were beginning to evolve both domestically and internationally. Third, the proliferation of different agreements on national,
sectoral, and association levels put pressure on international organizations to come up with an international and harmonized approach to these
issues. Indeed, the provisions of these different agreements offered a
sound basis for future norm construction.
III. ACT ONE: UNICTRAL ENTERS THE STAGE WITH THE MODEL LAW
29
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
UNICTRAL began consideration of potential work in electronic commerce in the early 1990s.30 Among other possible projects, it considered
drafting a model interchange agreement for electronic commerce; this
proposal was ultimately rejected for two reasons. First, UNCITRAL recognized that as an international organization its primary focus was on the
legal facilitation of international trade, and it might not have been as
suited to the drafting of these types of agreements as other organizations
whose constituents included businesspeople and technical people as well
as lawyers.31 Instead, UNCITRAL concluded that it was uniquely si28. See AMELIA H. BOSS & JEFFREY B. RITTER, ELECTRONIC DATA INTERCHANGE
AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE AND SOURCEBOOK 4–5, 15–18, 24 (1993); Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Data Interchange Agreements: Private Contracting Toward a Global Environment, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 31, 40–41 (1992).
29. For the text of the Model Law, see UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, supra note 15.
30. See generally Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship Between International and Domestic Law Reform, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1931, 1951–52
(1998).
31. Two groups were at the time involved in drafting such model interchange agreements. The first was the Working Party on the Facilitation of International Trade Procedures, now known as UN/CEFACT. See supra note 17. In 1995, UN/CEFACT published
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tuated to undertake the formulation of positive legal rules (either in convention form or model law form) to assist countries in addressing the
needs of electronic commerce in a harmonized manner, thereby eliminating barriers to international trade.32
Second, and more importantly, UNCITRAL rightly noted that the proliferation of model interchange agreements and the use of private ordering by the parties to electronic commerce transactions were not sufficient
to address all of the legal issues revolving around the use of electronic
commerce.33 In this respect, it is clear that there are important limitations
on the ability of such soft law products to resolve all the issues presented
by these transactions. Even with the evolution of these interchange
agreements, questions still remained as to the legality and enforceability
of electronically formed transactions, questions that could only affirmatively be resolved by judicial decision or legislation.34 Moreover, the
transition from proprietary communications networks to the environment
of the World Wide Web changed the commercial paradigm from one of
trade between established trading partners to an increasing number of
transactions between parties who had not had prior dealings with each
other.35 For these parties, legal norms in soft law products that in essence
its Recommendation No. 26. Working Party on the Facilitation of Int’l Trade Procedures,
Recommendation No. 26: Commercial Use of Interchange Agreements for Electronic
Data Interchange, U.N. Doc. ECE/TRADE/WP.4/R.1133/Rev.1 (1995). The second
body working on the development of a model agreement was the European Commission.
It published its model interchange agreement in 1994. Commission Recommendation of
19 October 1994 Relating to the Legal Aspects of Electronic Data Interchange, 94/820/EC,
1994 O.J. (L 338) 98–117.
32. See, e.g., UNCITRAL, Working Group on Int’l Payments, Report of the Working
Group on International Payments on the Work of Its Twenty-Fourth Session, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/360 (Feb. 17, 1992). It should be noted that there were technical and business people present at the subsequent deliberations at UNCITRAL on electronic commerce, but they participated more as technical experts than as the crafters of the ultimate
UNCITRAL products.
33. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT 1996, ¶ 140, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1999) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE GUIDE TO ENACTMENT].
34. For example, the law of many States required certain contracts to be in a writing
signed by the parties in order to be enforceable. Though the parties themselves might
agree that certain communications constituted writings and certain acts constituted signatures, there was no guarantee that any particular court might not disagree and proceed to
apply its statute of frauds. Though some of the trading partner agreements used other
tactics as well, such as agreements to waive the statute of frauds, those solutions did not
provide the desired legal certainty.
35. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 33, ¶ 140. On the limitations inherent in interchange agreements generally, see BOSS & RITTER, supra note 28,
at 8–9, 20–26; Boss, supra note 28, at 65–68.
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require parties to opt in (for example, by incorporating the products’
terms into master agreements) are of limited utility. Soft law norms that
operate independently of adoption by courts or legislatures have their
limits. Thus, the challenge presented to UNCITRAL was to propose a
legal structure for adoption by nations that would minimize the barriers
to electronic commerce. Yet, having determined that the model trading
partner agreements were of limited utility, the groundwork on which
UNCITRAL proceeded to build its own legal structure was the body of
norms that had begun to be articulated in the trading partner agreements
themselves.36
The challenge for UNCITRAL in articulating the legal norms for electronic commerce was fundamentally different than what it had faced in
other areas, such as sales (whether it be sales, carriage of goods, securities, or secured transactions). In many of these other areas, norms had
already developed on a national basis. Thus, in some areas of international commercial rule-making development, the question was one of
harmonization: how to take the laws of divergent nations (which in many
cases had already developed their own norms and made them a part of
their legal structures) and harmonize their provisions. In other areas, such
as securities and secured transactions, there were some countries with
very developed legal systems, and the question involved whether the legal structures that had evolved in these countries could be or should be
adapted for other legal cultures for use on an international basis. Electronic commerce was different. This was an area where there was no positive “hard” law in any country. Countries such as the United States,
where electronic commerce was beginning to burgeon, were starting to
acknowledge the need for legal norms, as the industry itself began to ask
for a legal rubric to support its transactions; in other countries, widespread use of electronic commerce was still in the future.37 At the time, it
was noted that
36. The foundation of UNCITRAL’s work in the body of business practices and
norms that had begun to develop was fostered by the participation of the business community (along with the legal community) in UNCITRAL’s deliberations in the area of
electronic commerce. See, e.g., ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note
33, ¶ 19. (“Chapter III of part one [of the Model Law] contains a set of rules of the kind
that would typically be found in agreements between parties, e.g., interchange agreements or ‘system rules.’”).
37. The concentration of electronic commerce use and revenues in those industrialized and developed countries with sophisticated technological infrastructures and its
underutilization in developing countries is one aspect of what has been referred to as the
great “digital divide.” UNCTAD has documented the existence of this divide. See U.N.
Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Secretariat, Electronic Commerce and Information and Communication Technologies for Development: Selected Issues, ¶¶ 5–8, U.N.
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as of yet, none of the developing and developed countries, common law
and civil law countries, and countries of different cultural and legal heritages, have developed a comprehensive legal structure governing
electronic commerce. Thus, the challenge is to take countries of divergent economic capabilities, legal heritage, telecommunications infrastructures, and needs, and bring them together to develop common analyses of, and approaches to, problems never encountered previously.38

As a result, when UNCITRAL began work on a model law on electronic commerce, many countries took up parallel drafting efforts to deal
with the same issues. The existence of parallel projects in the same field
(relatively unhampered by prior hard law on point), the overlap between
the personnel staffing the domestic lawmaking processes and those participating in the international lawmaking setting, and the technological
ability to instantaneously exchange information on new domestic and
international developments created a law reform process that might best
be described as “symbiotic,” with the domestic lawmaking projects and
the international lawmaking projects influencing and being influenced by
the other. The synergies between the domestic and international lawmaking efforts created a process that worked to strengthen both.39
As has been noted, the approach UNCITRAL initially took, once it had
rejected the concept of a model interchange agreement, was to draft “legal rules.” This original charge to the UNCITRAL Working Group, the
preparation of legal rules, was a charge flexible enough to allow the
Working Group to use whichever form was deemed appropriate: convention or treaty, or model law. Other techniques to promote harmonization
of international trade law include model treaty provisions, uniform rules
for parties to adopt, and legal guides. Indeed, up until its work was finally completed, UNCITRAL was still contemplating whether it would produce a set of model rules, rather than a more coherent and principled text
of a uniform law. Given the novelty of electronic commerce issues, the
Doc. TD/B/COM.3/62 (Oct. 7, 2003). UNCTAD has also developed an index for assessing countries’ development in the field. See UNCTAD, The Digital Divide: ICT Diffusion
Index 2005, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IPC/2006/5 (2006). See also UNCTAD, Information Economy Report 2007–2008: Science and Technology for Development: The New
Paradigm of ICT, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/SDTE/ECB/2007/1, at 12 (2007) (prepared by
the UNCTAD Secretariat) (characterizing the digital divide as still significant). Even
developing countries, however, were involved in UNCITRAL’s efforts in the areas of
electronic commerce, viewing the establishment of a supportive legal regime as one aspect of their creation of a hospitable environment for the growth of electronic commerce.
38. Amelia H. Boss, The Emerging Law of International Electronic Commerce, 6
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 293, 300–01 (1992).
39. See Boss, supra note 30, at 1958–63 (describing the symbiotic process at work in
the evolution of standards for the attribution of electronic messages to purported senders).
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differences that existed among the legal frameworks of the nation states,
and the minimalist rules that it finally articulated, however, UNCITRAL
ultimately did not venture to create a text that would bind the hands of
the enacting State, choosing instead a “softer” approach, that of a model
law:
The Model Law is intended to provide essential procedures and principles for facilitating the use of modern techniques for recording and
communicating information in various types of circumstances. However, it is a “framework” law that does not itself set forth all the rules and
regulations that may be necessary to implement those techniques in an
enacting State.40

The key attribute of the model law approach, which supported
UNCITRAL’s goal of providing merely a “framework law,” was the
flexibility it gave countries in their implementation of its provisions.
States considering the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (or “Model
Law”) have the option of either enacting the Model Law as a single statute or incorporating the Model Law’s various provisions into specific
parts of their domestic law.41
The Model Law on Electronic Commerce was completed and adopted
by the U.N. General Assembly in 1996, yet it began to influence the
shaping of domestic electronic commerce laws even prior to its completion. This is not surprising, given that some domestic lawmaking efforts
were proceeding on a parallel track at the same time, and as mentioned
above, domestic and international efforts influenced each other. In the
United States, drafting efforts to accommodate electronic contracting
within the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code were informed
by the work on the Model Law, and these drafting efforts eventually contributed to the formulation of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
(“UETA”) in 1999.42 Similarly, work was being undertaken in Canada on
40. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 33, ¶ 13.
41. At one stage, the working group considered describing its product as model statutory provisions rather than as a model law, noting that
the text contained a variety of provisions relating to existing rules scattered
throughout various parts of the national laws in an enacting State. It was thus a
possibility that enacting States would not incorporate the text as a whole and
that the provisions of such a “model law” might not appear together in any one
particular place in the national law.
Id. ¶ 142.
42. For a fuller description of the intricate relationship between domestic law developments in the United States and the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, see Boss,
supra note 30.
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a Uniform Electronic Commerce Act,43 but even before this act was
passed, the provisions found their way into various aspects of Canadian
law.44 Singapore was another early adopter of provisions somewhat in
accord with the Model Law.45
Though a soft law product, the success of the Model Law can be seen
from its enactment by countries around the world, including the following: developing countries (Vietnam) and developed countries; common
law countries (Australia) and civil law countries (France); countries in
North America (Canada), South America (Venezuela), Asia (Korea and
China), the Middle East (Jordan), Europe, both West (the United Kingdom) and East (Slovenia), and Africa (South Africa).46 It has been used
as the basis for domestic harmonization of e-commerce legislation in
federal systems such as Canada47 and the United States,48 and as the basis
for “hard law” harmonization projects by regional groups, such as the
electronic commerce projects in the Southern African Development
Community.49
43. See John D. Gregory, The UETA and the UECA—Canadian Reflections, 37
IDAHO L. REV. 441 (2001) (discussing the drafting of the Canadian Uniform Electronic
Commerce Act).
44. Terms of the draft Model Law were used as the basis for regulations permitting
electronic filing of speeding tickets issued in a photoradar system. See John D. Gregory,
Electronic Documents in Ontario’s Photoradar System, 6 J. MOTOR VEHICLE L. 277, 281
(1995).
45. Electronic Transactions Act, No. 25, Cap. 88 (1998) (Sing.), available at
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ (click “E” hyperlink; then follow “Electronic Transactions Act”
hyperlink).
46. For a list of country enactments of the Model Law, see Appendix F: Domestic
Enactments of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce, in U.N. GUIDE TO
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 18, at 493. See also UNCITRAL Texts and
Status, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009)
(providing a list of UNCITRAL products and the countries that have adopted each product). It should be noted that making any such list of enactments is difficult, since there is
no requirement that countries report their use of the Model Law in designing and enacting
domestic legislation.
47. The domestic enactment of the Model Law in Canada, the Uniform Electronic
Commerce Act, was adopted by the Uniform Law Commission of Canada in 1999 and
has since been implemented in every province but the Northwest Territories. See UNIF.
LAW CONFERENCE OF CAN., STATUS OF UNIFORM ACTS RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMERCIAL
LAW STRATEGY (2007), available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/cls/CLS_Status_Acts_En.pdf.
48. The UETA has been enacted in forty-six U.S. states, the District of Columbia, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands. See the Uniform Law Commissioners—A Few Facts About the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/
uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2009) (listing states adopting the UETA).
49. See South African Development Community, www.sadc.int (last visited Mar. 31,
2009). See also Harmonization of E-Commerce Legal Framework for Southern Africa,
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Why was the Model Law successful in bringing together countries “of
divergent economic capabilities, legal heritage, [and] telecommunications infrastructures”?50 The success of the Model Law is due in large
part to the fact that it was “a unique instrument in a legal landscape
where there was no existing body of law, whether uniform international
law or national law, which comprehensively addressed the issues raised
by electronic commerce.”51 As such, the Model Law has been “an instrument of ‘preventive’ or ‘pre-emptive’ harmonization: it led the
process of development of law by providing universally acceptable solutions to the issues likely to arise, rather than being negotiated after practices and usage had already resulted in disparate laws and regulations.”52
Of course, not all would agree that the Model Law on Electronic
Commerce was successful. Professor Justin Hughes, for example, has
argued that the convergence that emerged around the norms set forth in
the Model Law “would have occurred at roughly the same pace with or
without the UNCITRAL model.”53 It is true that the Model Law on Electronic Commerce was built on legal norms that were already developing,
but Professor Hughes appears to completely discount the role that the
Model Law had in legitimizing their development and contributing to
their spread to countries, particularly developing countries, where there
were no such norms. Indeed, the success of the Model Law should not be
measured solely, or even primarily, by the number of countries that used
the Model Law as the basis for their domestic enactments. It could be
argued that the process itself had a greater impact than the product. Electronic commerce was so sufficiently new and unfamiliar to people that
substantial time was spent in the negotiating sessions understanding the
technologies and their use, as well as attempting to ascertain the manner
in which existing law did or did not apply, or how it applied, to electronic transactions. The sessions were not characterized by political posturing
or attempts to persuade other delegations to adopt particular positions.
Critically important were the exchange of ideas and the education that
occurred about the challenges faced by electronic commerce. Countries
DOT-COMMENTS E-NEWSLETTER, Mar. 2007, at 19, available at http://www.dot-comalliance.org/newsletter/article.php?article_id=30.
50. Boss, supra note 38, at 300–01.
51. José Angelo Estrella Faria, Drafting and Negotiating History of the Electronic
Communications Convention, in U.N. GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, supra
note 18, at 17, 29.
52. Id.
53. Justin Hughes, Of World Music and Sovereign States, Professors and the Formation of Legal Norms, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 155, 177 (2003). Professor Hughes calls the
evolution of electronic commerce norms an “environment-based emergence of legal
norms” or “invisible hand convergence.” Id. at 175.
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could either be wary of these challenges and run from them, or embrace
electronic technologies. The work of UNICTRAL encouraged them to do
the latter by dispelling the fear of the unknown. The preparatory material
along with the reports from each of the sessions were for many delegations a gold mine of information about business practices as well as legal
issues.
Of course, not all countries adopted the Model Law on Electronic
Commerce in a uniform manner. To some degree, this lack of uniformity
in the adoption process was inherent in the choice of a model law format
for the treatment of electronic commerce and in the needs of countries to
conform the Model Law to their domestic law. But some of the nonuniformity arose for reasons that were not anticipated.
IV. ACT TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF DIGITAL SIGNATURE LEGISLATION
Even before the Model Law on Electronic Commerce was completed,
problems began to surface. While the approach of the Model Law and its
related siblings was one of enabling and supporting rather than regulating
and guiding the use of electronic commerce, the argument was heard in
some quarters that “more” was needed—more guidance, more regulation,
more focus. Compounding this was the drafting in some states in the
United States of digital signature statutes, which sought to enshrine in
their provisions the recognition of a specific implementation and use of
electronic technologies—digital signatures—and to establish public key
infrastructures to support their use.
Digital signature legislation grew out of the pioneering work of a
group within the American Bar Association that saw the benefits that
could be achieved by adopting this type of technology.54 While it is
beyond the scope of this Article to delve into the intricacies of digital
signatures and public key infrastructures, the following summary may be
helpful. “Digital signatures” are an advanced form of cryptography used
to guarantee the authenticity and integrity of electronic documents. However, their use between parties who do not deal directly with each other
depends upon the existence of an infrastructure that allows the parties to
determine the authenticity of the digital signatures themselves. Building
a public key infrastructure that provides this ability in turn requires regu54. This movement had its genesis in the United States in the work of the American
Bar Associations’ Section on Science and Technology, which promulgated the Digital
Signature Guidelines in 1996. These Guidelines set out policy issues that needed to be
faced in order to implement a legal structure to support the use of digital signatures. AM.
BAR ASS’N, DIGITAL SIGNATURE GUIDELINES: LEGAL INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (1996), available at
http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html.
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lating the rights and responsibilities of the parties involved in such an
infrastructure.55 Digital signature legislation attempted to further the
adoption of these technologies by providing a mechanism for building
the needed public key infrastructures and establishing the rights and responsibilities of the parties in that system. An early adopter of this approach was the state of Utah.56
Digital signature legislation in the United States, particularly the Utah
statute, was not without its critics, who raised several major concerns.
First, the critics were concerned that having legislation dictate the use of
one technology to the exclusion of others would interfere with the ability
of private parties to determine the type of technology suitable for their
particular transactions. Indeed, government regulators would replace
businesses in determining the level of security and the propriety of authentication techniques that businesses should use. Second, there was the
concern that the technology as it then existed did not in fact deliver the
level of security that it purported to, and that with the passage of time
what was once secure would cease to be.57 Third, there was the concern
that having a scheme that enshrined one technology and its application in
a statutory form would freeze the development of other technologies and
other business practices.58 This third concern reflected the view that the
technology might not be implemented in the way that the early digital
signature legislation foresaw, and that the technology itself might develop in ways that the statute did not anticipate.59 Last, the balance struck in
this digital signature legislation, particularly the risk allocation between

55. For an overview of this technology and its application, see WARWICK FORD &
MICHAEL S. BAUM, SECURE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (2d ed. 2000); ONLINE LAW: THE
SPA’S LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET chs. 3–4, 31 (Thomas J. Smedinghoff ed., 1996); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES WITH GUIDE
TO ENACTMENT 2001, supra note 15, at 20–31, ¶¶ 31–62.
56. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -104 (1996), repealed by 2006 Utah Laws,
ch. 21, § 13.
57. See, e.g., Henry Gabriel, The Fear of the Unknown: The Need to Provide Special
Procedural Protections in International Electronic Commerce, 50 LOY. L. REV. 307, 316
(2004) (“[A]ttempts to develop rules on standards and procedures to be used as substitutes for specific instances of ‘signatures’ have been unsuccessful as they have tied the
legal frameworks to a given state of technical development.”).
58. Zhang Chu & Lingfei Lei, The Chinese Approach to Electronic Transactions
Legislation, 9 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. J. 333, 343 (2005) (“[W]hat may be an adequate
technical solution today may cease to be adequate with advances in information technologies tomorrow.”).
59. See Jane K. Winn, The Emperor’s New Clothes: The Shocking Truth about Digital Signatures and Internet Commerce, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 353, 377–79, 381–82 (2001)
(presciently predicting possible uses for digital signature technology).
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users of the technology in the event of fraud,60 was attacked as inappropriate.61
In response to the criticism that the Utah statute dictated or enshrined
one technology to the exclusion of others, Illinois adopted an approach62
(referred to as a “hybrid” or two-tiered approach) that combined the minimalistic provisions that were essential to both the Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the UETA and provisions that would support the
technological choices made by private parties with additional protections
given to those who chose to use electronic signatures. The Illinois act
thus tried to retrieve the flexibility of the Model Law on Electronic
Commerce while at the same time giving some certainty to the use of
particular types of electronic technologies.
Both the Utah and Illinois legislation had an impact outside the United
States. While some countries adopted legislation like that in Utah, which
prescribed particular technology in the form of digital signatures (legislation known as digital signature legislation),63 other countries, following
Illinois, adopted hybrid legislation, which combined the supportive and
minimalist provisions of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (and its
sibling the UETA) with the more regulatory provisions of digital signature
legislation.64 In the United States, Illinois stood alone among the states
taking such a hybrid approach; others stuck with the familiar UETA. In60. See Jane K. Winn, The Hedgehog and the Fox: Distinguishing Public and Private
Sector Approaches to Managing Risk for Internet Transactions, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 955,
962 n.18 (1999).
61. See Jane K. Winn & Song Yuping, Can China Promote Electronic Commerce
Through Law Reform? Some Preliminary Case Study Evidence, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
415, 438 (2007) (“This problem was described in the U.S. in the 1990s as ‘Grandma
picks a bad password and loses her house.’”).
62. Illinois Electronic Commerce Security Act, 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/99-1 to -101
(West 2001). The Illinois Act was signed into law before the promulgation of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, but has provisions validating electronic records and
signatures that are similar to some in the UETA. The Illinois Act aims to ensure the integrity of electronic records and the authenticity of electronic signatures by providing special evidentiary rules for proving the integrity of electronic records and the authenticity of
electronic signatures if “secure” electronic records and “secure” electronic signatures are
used. Id. 175/10-120.
63. Early examples included Germany and Malaysia.
64. This led to attempts to categorize national electronic commerce legislation into
one of three categories: minimalist (based on the Model Law on Electronic Commerce);
prescriptive or regulatory (directing use of digital signature technology in particular); and
hybrid or two-tiered legislation. See MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, & STEPTOE & JOHNSON
LLP, AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONIC AND DIGITAL SIGNATURE IMPLEMENTATION INITIATIVES: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE INTERNET LAW AND POLICY FORUM
(2000), available at http://www.ilpf.org/groups/analysis_IEDSII.htm [hereinafter ILPF
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE INITIATIVES].
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deed, within the United States, both the Utah and Illinois approaches
were eschewed in the drafting of the federal Electronic Signatures in
Global and National Commerce Act (“E-SIGN”),65 which was passed in
2000. E-SIGN, like the UETA, was built on the principle of technology
neutrality, and preempts any state statute setting forth alternative procedures or technologies for the use or acceptance of electronic signatures to
establish the legal effect, validity, or enforceability of contracts unless
that legislation does not “require, or accord greater legal status or effect
to, the implementation or application of a specific technology or technical specification for performing the functions of creating, storing, generating, receiving, communicating, or authenticating electronic records or
electronic signatures.”66 Digital signature legislation, which does accord
greater legal status to digital signatures, appears to violate this principle
and therefore to be preempted by E-SIGN. The Illinois approach is more
problematic, for while it does not necessarily single out digital signatures
for special treatment, it does establish a category of “qualified” signatures that are given greater legal significance. To this day, the debate still
continues as to whether the laws of states that went beyond the UETA
(such as Illinois) are or are not preempted by E-SIGN.67
Following the enactment of E-SIGN in the United States, the Illinois
legislation and the Utah legislation, which began digital signature legislation, were unable to gain additional adherents within the United States.
Indeed, Utah ultimately repealed its digital signature legislation.68 Nonetheless, the approaches these two states advocated did gain international
adherents.
On the international level, Singapore became the first country to enact
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, passing its Electronic Transactions Act on July 10, 1998.69 This is the “good news.” Though the Singapore legislation purported to enact the Model Law, it borrowed liberally
as well from U.S. precedent. Many of its provisions are drawn from the
Illinois Electronic Commerce and Security Act and the Utah Digital Sig-

65. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001–
21 (2000).
66. Id. § 7002(a)(2)(A)(ii).
67. The creation in the Illinois Act of different categories of electronic signatures and
records has been argued to violate the principle of technology neutrality and thus to be
preempted by E-SIGN. At this stage, however, the preemption issues remain unresolved.
See generally Jamie A. Splinter, Does E-Sign Preempt the Illinois Electronic Commerce
Security Act?, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 129 (2002).
68. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -104 (1996), repealed by 2006 Utah Laws,
ch. 21, § 13.
69. Electronic Transactions Act, No. 25, Cap. 88 (1998) (Sing.).
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nature Act.70 Singapore’s action was not an isolated incident; others,
such as Germany71 and Malaysia,72 followed suit. The European Union,
in an effort to avoid diverse and incompatible electronic commerce regimes among its countries, adopted an electronic signature directive giving special weight and importance to digital signatures.73
The emergence of these types of digital signature legislation created a
demand within UNCITRAL from countries that wanted more specific
and detailed rules such as those in the digital signature legislation. There
was an attempt (by the United States) to push for a convention based on
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, but work nonetheless proceeded first on electronic signatures.74 The result was the Model Law on
Electronic Signatures, completed by UNCITRAL in 2001 (or “Second
Model Law”).
As a key participant in its deliberations observed, “the negotiation of
the [S]econd [M]odel [L]aw proved to be more difficult” than the negotiation of the earlier Model Law on Electronic Commerce.75 The debates
during the drafting of the Second Model Law reflected divergent views
on whether countries should take a leading role in defining technologies
to be used by private parties, the degree to which party autonomy was to
be respected, whether the law should reflect or direct developments in
electronic commerce, and the appropriate level of government regulation
of security in private relationships.76 The United States, where digital
signature legislation was born, in many respects disinherited its child,
and worked within UNCITRAL to keep the legislation as nonregulatory
and permissive as possible.77 Industry groups such as the Internet Policy
70. Compare id., with Illinois Electronic Commerce and Security Act, 5 ILL COMP.
STAT. 175 (1999), and Utah Digital Signature Act, UTAH CODE. ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to
-504 (1999).
71. Gesetz zur Digitalen Signatur [Signaturgesetz] [SigG] [German Digital Signatures
Act 1997], Jun. 13, 1997, BGBl. I at 1870, 1872 (F.R.G.), available at http://net-law.de/
gesetze/sigg.htm.
72. Digital Signature Act (1997) (Malay.), available at http://www.parlimen.gov.my/
actindexbi/pdf/ACT-562.pdf.
73. A Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, Council Directive 1999/93,
2000 O.J. (L 13), 12 [hereinafter Council Directive 1999/93].
74. See UNCITRAL, Working Group on Elec. Commerce, Proposal by the United
States, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.77 (May 25, 1998).
75. Faria, supra note 51, at 30.
76. For the “official” summary of some of those debates, see UNCITRAL MODEL
LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT 2001, supra note 15, at 13,
¶¶ 18–19.
77. For the views of one of the American participants in the process, see Do You
Know Who You Are Doing Business with? Signatures in a Digital Age: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Science Subcomm. on Tech. (Oct. 28, 1997) (testimony of Stewart A.
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and Law Forum,78 joined by academics,79 were critical of this digital signature legislation. But the pressure to do something beyond the Model
Law on Electronic Commerce to provide added “security,” combined
with a fascination with the new technology and a desire to lead the way
in the field, created momentum within UNCITRAL to move forward in
the field.80
The final product, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, was described in its accompanying Guide to Enactment as “[b]uilding on the
fundamental principles underlying article 7 of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on Electronic Commerce” with a “modest but significant addition”
offering “practical standards against which the technical reliability of
electronic signatures may be measured.”81 It purported to reflect the principle of “technology neutrality” as well.82 The Guide to Enactment did
recognize the argument that “some countries consider that the legal issues related to the use of electronic signatures have already been solved
by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce and do not plan
to adopt further rules on electronic signatures until market practices in
that new area are better established,” but opined that those also adopting
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures “may expect additional beneBaker, Steptoe & Johnson LLP), available at http://wbenton.tripod.com/tech/digisig_
testimony.htm.
78. ILPF ANALYSIS OF ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE INITIATIVES, supra note 64.
79. See, e.g., C. Bradford Biddle, Legislating Market Winners: Digital Signature
Laws and the Electronic Commerce Marketplace, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1225, 1226–27
(1997); Winn, supra note 59, at 357.
80. Contributing to the pressure was the fact that the European Union in 1999
adopted a digital signature directive. Council Directive 1999/93, supra note 73, at 14.
The goal of the directive was to harmonize the law among the Member States, which had
taken divergent directions to electronic commerce: Germany and Italy were great supporters of digital signature legislation, while States such as the United Kingdom shared the
skepticism of many about the viability of such legislation, preferring instead the more
flexible and technology-neutral approach exemplified in the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce. The existence of the directive, however, was an extremely influential factor in the debates leading to the evolution of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures, as it was effectively viewed as the “law” and the position of all the EU
Member States.
81. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT 2001, supra note 15, at 8, ¶ 4.
82. Id. art. 3. See also id. at 9, ¶ 5; id. at 18, ¶ 27; id. at 21, ¶ 34; id. at 33, ¶ 67; id. at
40, ¶ 88; id. at 48–49, ¶ 107. Nonetheless, the Guide to Enactment makes it clear that the
purpose of the Model Law was to validate the use of one particular technology—digital
signatures—and to provide a structure for its implementation. Id. at 18–19, ¶ 28 (“The
Model Law thus provides common grounds for [public key infrastructure] systems relying on independent certification authorities and electronic signature systems where no
such independent third party is involved in the electronic signature process.”).
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fits” in providing guidance in the establishment of public key infrastructures (although it was not necessarily limited to such systems).83
Despite this language about the relationship between the two model
laws, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures represented an important
departure in tone and direction from its older sibling. While the earlier
Model Law merely provided that an electronic signature could satisfy the
legal requirements of a signature if it was “as reliable as was appropriate,” the Model Law on Electronic Signatures set out the circumstances
under which an electronic signature was considered to be reliable.84 It
also set out rules for assessing the conduct of the signatory,85 the relying
party,86 and any certification service provider,87 as well as standards for
determining the trustworthiness of systems, procedures, and human resources.88 All of the detailed rules have one primary (or sole) application:
the use of digital signatures in public key infrastructures.89 The Model
Law on Electronic Signatures was thus more specific, with less flexible
rules, and gave more power to governments to set the rules for determining the acceptability of electronic signatures. More significantly, while
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce had been acceptable to a wide
variety of nations, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was more
controversial.
Once the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was completed (and
even before then), it too began to have an impact. Or, in Professor Macdonald’s words, depending upon one’s view, the “virus” had begun to
spread.90 The Model Law on Electronic Signatures, though it did not receive the same reception as the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, did
gain a number of adherents.91 Just as the Model Law on Electronic
83. Id.
84. Id. art. 6(3).
85. Id. art. 8.
86. Id. art. 11.
87. Id. art. 9.
88. Id. art. 10.
89. Indeed, a fair amount of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures
Guide to Enactment is devoted to explaining the operation of digital signatures and public
key infrastructures. See id. at 20–31, ¶¶ 31–62.
90. See Macdonald, supra note 13, at 635–49 (discussing the viral propagation metaphor).
91. Though it is difficult to determine the extent to which the Model Law on Electronic Signatures has had favorable reception, as most of the digital signature legislation
predates the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, the UNCITRAL website reports that
legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures has been
adopted in China (2004), Mexico (2003), Thailand (2001), the United Arab Emirates
(2006), and Viet Nam (2005), and that legislation influenced by the principles on which
the Model Law is based has been enacted in Costa Rica (2005). UNICTRAL Model Law
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Commerce has been used for regional harmonization projects, the Model
Law on Electronic Signatures has been advanced as a template for regional harmonization projects on cyberlaw.92
Yet, in fashioning their own laws, some countries relied less on the
Model Law on Electronic Signatures than on other digital signature legislation. An example is China, with its enactment of the Electronic Signatures Law and the Administrative Measure on Electronic Certification
Service.93 Other countries that jumped on the digital signature bandwagon include Dubai and Nepal.94 One commentator has noted that crossborder recognition of signatures and their supporting devices, one of the
primary goals of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, “remains a
largely unsettled issue,”95 mainly because of the lack of worldwide implementation of common standards.
It should be noted, however, that most if not all of the countries that
have recently adopted digital signature legislation have been developing
on Electronic Signatures—Status, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/elec
tronic_commerce/2001Model_status.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
However, as noted, other countries, such as Germany, have independently
adopted legislation more akin to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures.
See Minyan Wang, A Review of Electronic Signatures Regulations: Do They Facilitate or
Impede International Electronic Commerce?, 156 ACM INT. CONF. PROC. SERIES 548
(2006), abstract available at http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1151454.1151458#.
Other countries have adopted legislation dealing specifically with and giving special
treatment to digital signatures and their use in electronic commerce. See Jeff Hynick,
May I Borrow Your Mouse? A Note On Electronic Signatures in The United States, Argentina and Brazil, 12 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 159, 174–75 (2005) (noting the lack of
technology neutrality in the digital signature statutes in Argentina and Brazil, and their
lack of flexibility to accommodate advances in technology).
92. See, e.g., UNCTAD, E. Af. Cmty. Secretariat, Report of the 2d Regional Taskforce Meeting on Cyber Laws, U.N. Doc. EAC/TF/2/2008 (Jun. 23–25, 2008).
93. See generally Gao Fuping, Implementation of the Electronic Communications
Convention: A Chinese Perspective, in U.N. GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS,
supra note 18, at 385. See also Chu & Lei, supra note 58, at 342; Aashish Srivastava, No
Rice, No Wife to Cook: An Analysis of the Electronic Signatures Law of China, 13 INT’L
J.L. & INFO. TECH. 437, 438 (2005).
94. Other examples of countries with a required digital signature regime such as China’s include Nepal and Dubai. Stephen E. Blythe, On Top of the World and Wired: A
Critique of Nepal’s E-Commerce Law, 8 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2008). See also Stephen E.
Blythe, Azerbaijan’s E-Commerce Statutes: Contributing to Economic Growth and Globalization in the Caucasus Region, 1 COLUM. J. E. EUR. L. 44 (2007) (noting that Azerbaijan has a permissive digital signature regime); Stephen E. Blythe, The Dubai Electronic
Transactions Statute: A Prototype for E-Commerce Law in the United Arab Emirates and
the G.C.C. Countries, 23 J. ECON. & ADMIN. SCI. 103, 111, 114 (2007), available at
http://jeas.cbe.uaeu.ac.ae/jeas2007_Jun/04_Stephen.pdf (explaining and analyzing Dubai’s Electronic Transactions Law).
95. Faria, supra note 51, at 30.
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countries. Moreover, most of the countries that have adopted digital signature legislation or even the hybrid version exemplified by the European Union have found that it has failed to promote the use of digital
signature technology in electronic commerce. While the use of digital
signatures has increased, it has not been in the business context that the
digital signature legislation contemplated. Several studies in the European Union from 2002 to 2006 illustrate this point. The first, undertaken
on behalf of the European Commission in 2002, found that there was “no
natural market demand” for qualified certificates and related services,96
and “low market uptake” of public key infrastructure technologies.97 The
report observed that the directive “focuses strongly on one business
model which took center stage from 1998 to 2000, but which has since
been replaced by a more heterogeneous and complex market.”98 A
second study in the United Kingdom revealed similar results about the
marketplace.99 A final report issued by the Commission in 2006 on its
electronic signatures directive found that private parties had not been
using digital signatures in their private transactions with commercial parties,100 and that there has been a “very slow take up” on the use of advanced or qualified electronic signatures, yet it also found that many other simpler electronic signature applications had become available.101 The
report advanced a number of theories for these findings: technical prob-

96. Interdisciplinary Ctr. for Law & Info. Tech., The Legal and Market Aspects of
Electronic Signatures: Legal and Market Aspects of the Application of Directive
1999/93/EC and Practical Applications of Electronic Signatures in the Member States,
the EEA, the Candidate and the Accession Countries (2003) (prepared by Jos Dumortier
et al.), available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/2005/all_about/
security/electronic_sig_report.pdf.
97. Id. ¶ 5.1.
98. Id. ¶ 5.5.3.
99. RICHARD WILSHER & JANE HILL, DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., REPORT ON THE
IMPACT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF THE EC ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES FRAMEWORK
DIRECTIVE, 2003, Doc. DTI TFBJ/C/003/006 IX, 2003, at 7, quoted in Winn & Yuping,
supra note 61, at 441 n.85 (“[T]he study uncovered a far greater degree of indifference,
cynicism and lack of faith in private sector use of electronic signatures than it did enthusiasm and belief in a burgeoning market.”).
100. See Report on the Operation of Directive 1999/93/EC on a Community Framework for Electronic Signatures, ¶ 5.2, COM (2006) 120 final (Mar. 15, 2006) [hereinafter
Report on the Operation of Council Directive 1999/93]. See also Jane K. Winn & Brian
H. Bix, Diverging Perspectives on Electronic Contracting in the U.S. and EU, 54 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 175, 180 (2006) (discussing substantive and procedural fairness in electronic
contracting between individuals and commercial parties).
101. Report on the Operation of Council Directive 1999/93, supra note 100, ¶ 3.1. The
use of digital signatures was found to be limited to the e-banking and e-government arenas. Id. ¶ 3.2.

2009]

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

697

lems in the market place, a lack of criteria for certification and mutual
recognition, a lack of interoperability at national and cross-border levels,
and the existence of isolated areas where certificates were used for a single purpose.102 The Commission report noted that
[t]he main reason for the slow take-off of the market is economic: service providers have little incentive to develop multi-application electronic signature[s] and prefer to offer solutions for their own services,
for instance, solutions developed by the banking sector. This slows
down the process of developing interoperable solutions. The lack of
applications . . . might also prevent the development of a multi-purpose
e-signature, which requires reaching a critical mass of users and
usage.103

Some developing countries had adopted electronic commerce legislation with a hope that by eliminating the barriers to electronic trade they
might promote greater electronic commerce by their businesses. What
these studies were beginning to demonstrate is that hopes of building
strong digital signature infrastructures were not even being realized in
developed countries through digital signature legislation.104
Professor Jane Winn, a noted scholar in the field, predicted this result
shortly after the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was completed:
Some . . . believed that the E-Signatures Model Law was based on an
outmoded idea of how digital signatures are likely to be used in Internet
commerce and thought that the Model Law compounded this shortcoming by mandating risk allocation rules that are counter-intuitive and unproductive. In addition, the E-Signatures Model Law was promulgated
by UNCITRAL after developed countries had already passed laws dealing with the same subject matter in quite different ways than the Model
Law. Because it is unlikely any developed countries are going to repeal
their current laws in order to enact legislation based on the Model Law,
the Model Law is unlikely to achieve its objective of harmonizing law
in this area. What it is likely to do, however, is encourage developing
countries to pass laws that are out of step with actual commercial practice in Internet commerce, further disadvantaging their local businesses
that try to compete in the global information economy.105

102. Id. ¶ 3.3.2.
103. Id. ¶ 5.2.
104. See, e.g., Winn & Yuping, supra note 61, at 417 (suggesting that “government
efforts to promote the use of electronic commerce among local businesses will require
much more than transferring legislative models created for developed market economies
to transition economies such as China’s if they are to succeed”).
105. Jane Winn, Electronic Commerce Law: 2001 Developments, 57 BUS. LAW. 541,
550 (2001). Others knowledgeable in the field have agreed. See John D. Gregory, Cana-
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Professor Winn’s views, though they may be shared by many people in
many countries, have not been universally adopted. The European Commission was not deterred by the failure of the market to adopt digital signatures; instead, it stated that it would continue to encourage the development of e-signatures services and applications, with an emphasis on
interoperability and cross-border use.106 So while the jurisdiction that
pioneered it all, Utah, repealed its law, the first digital signature law, fifteen years after its passage,107 with the observation that the legislation
had been unsuccessful in encouraging the establishment of digital signature systems,108 digital signature and electronic signature legislation continues to find fertile ground for propagation in other countries.
V. LESSONS FROM THE TWO MODEL LAWS
The two UNCITRAL Model Laws tell different stories. One, the Model Law on Electronic Commerce, though criticized for not doing enough,
gained great acceptance throughout the world. The other, criticized for
doing too much, has nonetheless also been utilized as a guide for countries wishing to adapt their laws for electronic commerce. Neither has
been enacted uniformly, and variations exist in their implementation
from country to country. Could it be said that one of the Model Laws is
more successful than the other?
Judging from the goals of the two laws, the Model Law on Electronic
Commerce is arguably more successful. Its main goal was the removal of
legal barriers to electronic commerce, a goal it has to some degree
achieved. The goal of the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was lof-

dian and American Legislation on Electronic Signatures with Reflections on the European Union Directive (2001), http://droit-internet-2001.univ-paris1.fr/pdf/ve/Gregory_J.pdf
(“[E]-commerce is global in scope, and neither country wants to take a seriously different
approach from its major partners.”).
106. Winn, supra note 105.
107. The bill repealing the Utah Digital Signature Act was signed into law in 2006.
S.B. 20, 2006 Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2006) (enacted). For the repeal of the Utah Digital
Signature Statute Rules, see 22 UTAH BULL. 16 (Nov. 15, 2007).
108. See Wendy Leibowitz, Utah Will Repeal Its Digital Signature Law, Never Used,
as Tech, National Law Diverged, 10 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 48 (Dec. 21,
2005), available at http://ipcenter.bna.com/pic2/ip.nsf/id/BNAP-6KCM2E?OpenDocument
&PrintVersion=Yes (On March 10, 2006, Utah’s Governor signed S.B. 20, supra note
107, repealing the Utah Digital Signature Act because no one was using digital signatures.). Although electronic commerce has not gone heavily into digital signatures and
public key infrastructures, a number of governments in Europe use it for communications
with the government in areas such as tax filings and identity cards. See DESIGNING EGOVERNMENT: ON THE CROSSROADS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND INSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE (J.E.J. Prins ed., 2001).
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tier: to set common standards for the recognition of electronic signatures
in a way that allowed for cross-border recognition. As noted, that has not
occurred. The differences, however, are greater. The Model Law on
Electronic Commerce was built on prior business practices that had
evolved internationally, and found much inspiration in the trading partner
agreements that had been drafted over the years for use by commercial
parties. The Model Law on Electronic Signatures was built on a technology that had not yet received widespread use, and was an attempt to
guide the development of business practices and norms. And while the
Model Law on Electronic Commerce gave great leeway to parties to determine their own levels of security in their business dealings, the Model
Law on Electronic Signatures gave a greater role to governmental entities
to determine the trustworthiness of signature technologies.
Arguably, while the Model Law on Electronic Commerce emphasized
the common goal of many countries to accommodate electronic commerce to paper-based rules by establishing an equivalence between the
two, the Model Law on Electronic Signatures emphasized the distinctions among countries based to a large extent on cultural predispositions.
The first Model Law on Electronic Commerce resonated with societies
where there was emphasis on a free marketplace with the maximum
amount of party autonomy, where the thought was that practice should
lead and the law should follow. The Model Law on Electronic Signatures, however, represented a different philosophy: that the law should
lead and tell private commercial parties the manner in which they should
do business. Although the Model Law on Electronic Signatures carefully
tried to continue the emphasis on technology neutrality and party autonomy, it was readily adaptable (and has been adapted) in ways that undercut these basic notions.
The comparison of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the
Model Law on Electronic Signatures vividly illustrates the point that not
all “soft laws,” though drafted by the same body on roughly the same
subject matter, are equal. Though both Model Laws professed to be flexible in their implementation, the Model Law on Electronic Commerce
may be characterized as setting forth general principles (e.g., an electronic signature may satisfy signature requirements if it is reliable), whereas
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures attempted to lay out the standards by which the general principle was to be applied.109 The Model
109. There is another example in electronic commerce demonstrating that attempts to
develop rigid detailed rules for electronic commerce may be doomed, compared to attempts to develop more general principles that can be adapted to changes in technology
and the evolution of practices. The UETA (adopted in 1999), consisting of only twentyone provisions, has been adopted in forty-eight states and jurisdictions and become the
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Law on Electronic Commerce is an example of principles-based harmonization, as opposed to rules-based harmonization exemplified by the
Model Law on Electronic Signatures.
Of course, the success of the Model Laws should not be measured
solely on the basis of the number of enactments; as noted above, enactments may or may not result in harmonization. Moreover, harmonization
may not be the only criteria by which to measure success. Articulation of
the legal issues by a body of the stature of UNCITRAL performs the important function of educating people about some of the legal ramifications of using electronic technologies: “[t]he Commission noted with
satisfaction that the Working Group had become generally recognized as
a particularly important international forum for the exchange of views
regarding the legal issues of electronic commerce and for the preparation
of solutions to those issues.”110
Second, apart from its pure educational value, the Model Law serves as
a framework for countries that wish to draft their own law on electronic
commerce, rather than adopt in full the work of the United Nations. In
some countries, such as Sweden, the Model Law may be used as a guide
for reviewing existing legislation to determine whether it satisfies the
principles laid out in the Model Law. It is noteworthy that the provisions
of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce are even being used by
UNCITRAL, which includes them in its other products in an attempt to
foundation of federal legislation. Uniform Law Commissioners: The National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act, http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009). The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
(“UCITA”), completed the same year and consisting of some 121 provisions attempting
to set forth rules covering all aspects of computer information transactions, was enacted
in only two states. Uniform Law Commissioners: The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp
(last visited Apr. 3, 2009). The latter effort, however, laid the foundation for another “soft
law” project, the Principles of Software Contracting, which will receive final approval by
its sponsor, the American Law Institute, in May 2009. Maureen A. O’Rourke, An Essay
on the Challenges of Drafting a Uniform Law of Software Contracting, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 925, 926 (2006). It remains to be seen whether this “soft law” project will
be any more successful than its predecessor, UCITA. What differentiates the two? One is
a proposed law that, upon enactment, is “hard law”; the other consists of mere suggestions for either judicial or legislative adaptation, but does not purport to be a statute. One
is a long, detailed set of rules and standards; the other is flexible principles. The Principles do not seek to restate the developing law. Rather, they seek to “identify . . . transactions giving rise to disputes and litigation because they do not fit well within existing
law and . . . address them in a technology-neutral way.” Id. at 931.
110. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, supra note 33, ¶ 16.
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accommodate electronic commerce.111 Third, even in the absence of
positive domestic law adopting the provisions of the Model Law, it is
possible that when disputes arise in the international context, the Model
Law may be used as an authoritative source of norms (even if not binding) in the application of relevant domestic legal principles.
In this respect, it is the process that is important: Who are the participants? What is the nature of the discussions? How are the debates
framed? From the perspective of at least one participant in the process,
there was a substantial difference between the negotiations on the Model
Law on Electronic Commerce and the Model Law on Electronic Signatures. The former negotiations were populated by those who, struggling
to understand the nature of electronic commerce, were open-minded as to
possible solutions and were not advocates of a particular technology or
position. As a result, there was substantial give and take among the participants and more learning resulted. By the time of the negotiations on
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, countries’ views had solidified
more around preferred approaches and desirable technologies; the participants were more often instructed by their governments on what positions
to take, and there was more jockeying in trying to achieve ultimate goals.
Academics and businesspeople were more common in the first set of negotiations, government functionaries and diplomats in the second. And,
as has been observed, it is more difficult to produce detailed and precise
rules (as the Model Law on Electronic Signatures attempted to do) than
flexible, open-ended provisions that can accommodate diversity.112
VI. ACT THREE: THE UNCITRAL CONVENTION ON THE USE OF
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS
The Model Law on Electronic Commerce was completed in 1996, and
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures was completed in 2001. As
UNCITRAL began to consider what other work, if any, to undertake in
the area of electronic commerce, the concept that had surfaced earlier,
preparing a convention as opposed to a model law, was resurrected. Although there were cogent arguments that the two model laws were sufficient to provide countries with a structure for electronic commerce, it
was argued that a convention “could contribute to the legislative arsenal
of means of increasing legal certainty or commercial predictability in
electronic business transactions—alongside [the Model Law on Electron111. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, supra note 16, at 864.
112. Harry C. Sigman, Comments at the Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of International Business Law and the Brooklyn Journal of International Law Symposium: Ruling the World: Generating International Legal Norms (Oct. 24, 2008).
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ic Commerce].”113 Such a convention would apply to transactions under
international conventions like the Convention on the International Sale of
Goods, where the application of countries’ domestic electronic commerce laws might be problematic, and since a convention was arguably
easier for some countries to adopt than a model law, this type of convention would encourage wider adoption of electronic commerce rules.114
But for some, the strongest argument was that the “hard law” of a convention would visibly demonstrate that the principles on which it is
based are no longer tentative, but are viable, workable solutions that “deserve more legal force behind them.”115 An unarticulated hope for some
participants was that a convention would encourage countries to abandon
alternative approaches based on specific technology and represent a return to the technology-neutral, media-neutral principles on which the
original Model Law on Electronic Commerce was based.116
The United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts (“Convention”) has been described as
building on the Model Law on Electronic Commerce.117 The terminology
used in the Convention is drawn from the Model Law on Electronic
Commerce.118 More importantly, many of the Convention’s key provi-

113. John D. Gregory, The Proposed UNCITRAL Convention On Electronic Contracts,
59 BUS. LAW. 313, 317 (2003). See also SECRETARIAT’S EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note
15, ¶¶ 21–25.
114. See Gregory, supra note 113, at 317.
115. Id.
116. “Legal analysis had shown, however, that, despite an acceptable degree of harmonization, ‘many of the proposed and current laws are mutually exclusive; others disagree on basic principles, despite the stated desire to coordinate the drafting of domestic
laws.’” Faria, supra note 51, at 31–32, (quoting Christopher T. Poggi, Electronic Commerce Legislation: An Analysis of European and American Approaches to Contract Formation, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 224 (2000)).
117. José Angelo Estrella Faria, The United Nations Convention of the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts—An Introductory Note, 55 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. 689, 690 (2006).
118. More specifically, it adopts the vernacular of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce of referring to “data messages.” Compare 2005 UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 4(c), with UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 2(a). Compare also 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note
15, art. 4(d), with UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15,
art. 2(c) (originator); 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 4(e), with
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 2(d) (addressee); 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
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sions have their roots in the Model Law: the basic concept that communications or contracts shall not be denied validity or enforceability solely
because of their electronic form;119 the treatment of form requirements
such as writing requirements,120 signature requirements,121 and requirements for an original; and the basic rules on time and place of dispatch
and receipt of electronic communications.122 Not all of the substantive
provisions of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce were carried over
into the Convention; dropped were those provisions that had been omitted from many domestic implementations of the Model Law.123 Lastly,
there were articles added to the Convention that were absent in the Model Law.124 Significantly, several of the newer additions had originally
appeared in domestic legislation that was based on the Model Law on
Electronic Commerce, continuing the symbiotic process between interna-

IN INTERNATIONAL

CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 4(f), with UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
supra note 15, art. 2(f) (information system).
119. Compare 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 8, with
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 5 (information
shall not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability) and id. art. 11 (contract shall
not be denied legal effect).
120. Compare 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 9(2), with
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 6.
121. Compare 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 9(3), with
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 7.
122. Compare 2005 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE USE OF ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS, supra note 15, art. 10, with
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 15, art. 15.
123. Notable absences are the following provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce: Article 9 on the admissibility and evidentiary weight of data messages; Article 13 on the attribution of data messages (a concept that was not always carried over into domestic laws; Article 14 regarding acknowledgement of receipt (which
only applies if the parties themselves require such an acknowledgement); and the special
rules in part two of the Model Law on the carriage of goods. The omission of the rules in
part two bears emphasis: those rules were attempts to apply the general principles of the
Model Law to the specific area of the carriage of goods, and were the most detailed and
specific of the Model Law’s rules.
124. The three key new sections are Article 11 (invitations to make offers); Article 12
(use of automated message systems for contract formation), and Article 14 (error in electronic communication). UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note
15. The latter two sections were based on domestic legislation that had been enacted (e.g.,
the UETA in the United States), while the first responded to concerns about the legal
status of offerings on websites and in other electronic communications.
ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE,
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tional and domestic efforts.125 Throughout the Secretariat’s Explanatory
Note that accompanies the printed version of the Convention, there is
repeated discussion of the Convention’s roots in the Model Law on Electronic Commerce and comparison of the Model Law’s provisions of that
Model Law to those in the Convention. Thus, there appears to be a
process of restatement (of those provisions that have worked),126 refinement (of those provisions that need adjustment), rejection (of provisions
deemed unneeded or ultimately unworkable), and reinforcement (through
the addition of other related provisions). Notably absent in the Secretariat’s Explanatory Note accompanying the Convention is any discussion
of the other Model Law; in fact, there are only three passing references to
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures.127
As of the date of this Article, almost four years after the final adoption
of the Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts in 2005, it has been signed by eighteen countries (not
including the United States)128 but has received no ratifications. The rea125. Article 14 on errors in electronic communications is one such provision. See
SECRETARIAT’S EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 15, ¶ 225 (“Recent legislation on electronic commerce, including some domestic enactments of the UNCITRAL Model Law,
contain[s] provisions dealing with error . . . .”). Article 14 was “inspired by two statutes
that aimed to implement the [U.N.] Model Law on Electronic Commerce, namely the
Uniform Electronic Transactions Act . . . of the United States and the Uniform Electronic
Commerce Act . . . of Canada.” John D. Gregory & Joan Remsu, Article 14: Error in
Electronic Communications, in U.N. GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, supra
note 18, at 198, 200. These pieces of domestic legislation were in turn based on trading
partner or interchange agreements that frequently set forth error detection procedures and
rules for assigning risk of error.
Article 12 on automated message systems also had its roots in domestic legislation. UNCITRAL, Working Group on Elec. Commerce, Report of the Working Group on
Electronic Commerce on the Work of Its Forty-Second Session, ¶ 124, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/546 (Dec. 8, 2003) (“A number of jurisdictions have found it necessary or at
least useful to enact similar provisions in domestic legislation on electronic commerce.”).
This domestic legislation included acts in the United States, UNIF. ELEC. TRANS. ACT §
14(1) (2000); Canada, UNIF. ELEC. COM. ACT § 20 [ECA]; and the European Union,
Council Directive 95/46, art. 15, ¶ 1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.
126. The Convention could be viewed as a statement that the principles set forth in the
Model Law had obtained sufficient consensus and support so that hard law treatment in a
convention was possible and desirable.
127. See SECRETARIAT’S EXPLANATORY NOTE, supra note 15, ¶¶ 22, 287 (Convention
taken up after UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures); id. ¶ 150 (referring to
the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Signatures Guide to Enactment for a description of digital signatures).
128. The following countries are signatories to the Convention: Central African Republic, China, Colombia, Honduras, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Madagascar,
Montenegro, Panama, Paraguay, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, and Sri Lanka. Status—United
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son for the lack of action is unclear: do countries believe that there is no
need for the Convention in light of the wide adoption of electronic commerce legislation? Or are countries waiting to see if the major proponent
of the Convention, the United States, will enact it?
Efforts are underway in the United States to achieve ratification, but
the internal problems involved in ratification as the result of our federalist system are significant.129 There is a drafting committee within the
Uniform Law Conference in the United States exploring possible mechanisms for implementing the Convention should it be ratified.130 There
are many reasons for the United States to implement the Convention. In
its E-SIGN legislation, the United States adopted the principles of the
Model Law on Electronic Commerce as part of its foreign policy. Part
three of E-SIGN, which is directed to international developments, provides that the “Secretary of Commerce shall promote the acceptance and
use, on an international basis, of electronic signatures,”131 but more specifically, encourage governments to “[r]emove paper-based obstacles to
electronic transactions by adopting relevant principles from the Model
Law on Electronic Commerce adopted in 1996 by [UNCITRAL].”132 ESIGN, however, does not give the same approval to more specific legislation directed towards particular technologies.133 Given the support of
Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/electronic_commerce/2005Conventio_status
.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
129. See Amelia H. Boss, The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code in an Increasingly International World, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 352–58 (2007).
130. The Committee to Implement the U.N. E-Commerce Convention is chaired by
Professor Henry Deeb Gabriel, Jr.; the reporter is Professor D. Benjamin Beard. Uniform
Law Commission—National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=59 (last visited
Apr. 3, 2009).
131. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, 15 U.S.C. §
7031(a)(1) (2000).
132. Id. § 7031(a)(2)(A). Three years earlier, the Clinton administration had specifically endorsed the work of UNCITRAL in the area of electronic commerce, saying “[t]he
United States Government supports the adoption of principles along these lines by all
nations as a start to defining an international set of uniform commercial principles for
electronic commerce.” William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global
Electronic Commerce, http://people.hofstra.edu/peter_j_spiro/cyberlaw/framework.htm
(last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
133. Other principles are directly aimed at undermining digital signature-specific legislation. For example, permitting parties to a transaction “to determine the appropriate authentication technologies and implementation models for their transactions, with assurance that those technologies and implementation models will be recognized and enforced.” 15 U.S.C. § 7031(a)(2)(B). Or, taking a “nondiscriminatory approach to electronic signatures and authentication methods from other jurisdictions.” Id. § 7031(a)(2)(D).
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the United States for the Model Law and its encouragement of the Convention within UNCITRAL, as well as the support the Convention has
received from the legal community,134 there is a possibility of its ratification. Failure of the United States to ratify the Convention, however, may
be a disincentive for other countries to do so, and would therefore allow
the proliferation of different types of electronic commerce legislation to
continue.
If the Convention fails to achieve substantial (or any) ratifications, and
fails to come into force, would this mean it was a failure? If one measures success solely in terms of numbers of ratifications, and if one believes that a convention can only be successful if it comes into force, the
answer is yes. But if one considers not only the product, but the process
as well, there may be another answer. The existence of the Convention
has already provided the incentive to some countries to adopt its provisions as a matter of domestic law,135 and one commentator has observed
that the Convention “has become a useful legislative tool for many developing countries.”136 In addition, the Convention has been used as the
template for regional electronic commerce harmonization projects.137 The
Convention arguably serves another important educational point: it reinforces and ratifies the principles upon which the original Model Law on
Electronic Commerce was built. Those countries that have enacted digital signature legislation may find it necessary to reevaluate that legislation in light of the Convention’s provisions.138

134. The ABA House of Delegates at its 2006 Annual Meeting passed Resolution 303
recommending that the United States sign the Convention. Am. Bar Ass’n Annual Meeting, Resolution 303 (Aug. 6–7, 2006), available at www.abanet.org/leadership/2006/
annual/dailyjournal/threehundredthree.doc. Two years later, it passed a second resolution
recommending ratification. Am. Bar Ass’n Annual Meeting, Resolution 100 (Aug. 11–
12, 2008), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ecom/2008aug11_
resolution.htm. Similarly, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has indicated its support for the Convention.
135. See Jayantha Fernando, A Developing Country Perspective: The Impact of Electronic Communications Convention on Legislation in the South Asian Region, in U.N.
GUIDE TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 18, at 353, 355–73 (describing Sri
Lanka’s use of the Convention in its drafting of its own electronic commerce laws).
136. Id. at 355.
137. See Connolly, supra note 18, at 315 (describing the projects in Southeast Asia).
138. See Fernando, supra note 135 (comparing the degree to which the laws of Sri
Lanka and India are in conformity with the Convention, and noting that while the Convention was taken into account in the drafting of the Sri Lankan legislation, it was not
considered in the drafting of either the Indian legislation or proposed amendments to that
legislation). As Fernando concludes: “[t]his review establishes that it is easier for a country to implement the Convention if it has adopted the Model Law on Electronic Com-
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CONCLUSION
The law of electronic commerce has evolved significantly over the past
two decades. The evolution of electronic commerce norms during that
period reinforces the lesson in other areas of commercial law: it is imperative that any legal structure be built upon and reflect commercial practices in order for there to be an acceptable and viable system for trade.
The Model Law on Electronic Commerce was successful for that reason;
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures demonstrates the difficulties of
attempting to encourage particular business implementation structures
for the use of particular technologies where no prior foundation for them
exists in commercial practice. Second, while commercial practices are
developing or in flux, it is imperative that any legal norms be sufficiently
minimal and flexible to accommodate growth and change. The inherent
flexibility of the Model Law on Electronic Commerce may be objectionable because it fails to give specific guidance on how parties should
manage business affairs, but that flexibility is its strength, as it will accommodate newer technologies and emerging uses. Thirteen years after
its completion, it is now the basis for a new international convention. Yet
the Model Law on Electronic Signatures, eight years after its completion,
has not had the results its proponents sought and has failed to keep pace
with changes in commercial practice that have occurred. Perhaps, beginning with the Utah digital signature legislation, too high a premium was
placed on quickly producing a statute that represented the “new” technological face of government.
The products of the evolution of electronic commerce norms tell one
story; the process by which they were developed tells another. The
process was one of symbiosis: symbiosis between the domestic and the
international development of norms; between and among the countries;
and between the legal world and the business world. Throughout the
process, huge advances were made in appreciation of the technologies
themselves, their uses, and the legal framework surrounding them. The
educational process, however, is not always straightforward: there will
be false starts, missteps, mistakes. It is not always easy to know whether
a given direction is the right one to take. The question is whether the
symbiotic process, over time, results in the correction of these false
starts, or whether these false starts result in fragmentation of approaches
among the countries. The symbiotic process in the electronic commerce
arena was successful in the beginning, when all the participants in the
process had questions, but no one purported to have “the” answer. As
merce, but it is more difficult if it has adopted the Model Law on Electronic Signatures.”
Id. at 383.
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differing views emerged on the need for and role of standards in the area
of electronic commerce, the symbiotic process began to slow down. But
lawmaking is a constant process of action, reaction, and interaction. Let
us hope that the lull in symbiosis is temporary, and that the synergies that
contributed to the early developments in the field continue.

